In this paper, we study on how to construct an authenticated key exchange protocol in a device based authentication setting where an user who has a PUF-based device and its multi-factor authenticators desires to mutually authenticate a server. Generally, in a secure multi-factor authentication schemes, any adversary cannot impersonates a valid users unless A fully corrupts all multi-factor authenticators. However, in recent PUF-based device authenticated key exchange schemes, we observe a new impersonation attack that any adversary with only PUF's output is always able to impersonate any user. We first analyze how recent schemes are vulnerable against the new attack. Then we build a secure PUF-based device authenticated key exchange (PDAKE) with provable result. Since in our PDAE, user's device is an important authenticator, it is well applicable to establish a secure channel in multi-factor based FIDO (fast identification online) or cloud setting service like storage and e-mail services.
I. INTRODUCTION
An authenticated key exchange (AKE) allows two participants to agree on a session key with mutual authentication. In order to make a secure channel over public networks, a secure agreement of a session key should be efficiently made between participants. Thus, an efficient and secure AKE has always been a hot issue whenever advanced networks (e.g. cloud, WBAN (wireless body area network), UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle)) newly emerge. In this paper, we consider a physical unclonable function (PUF) as a new authentication factor that is generally embedded in a user's device, as illustrated in Fig. 1 . On input of long-term secret x, PUF always outputs an unpredictable value y (y = PUF(x)). Since it has physical unclonable property in the process of manufacturing, a final secret value y cannot be compromised even though a long-term secret x is revealed. Thus, recently there have been many studies on how PUF is securely conjoined with the various authentication setting with well-developed AKE [1] , [5] , [6] , [8] , [10] , [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] , [21] . In fact, specific protocols have been presented with multi-factor authenticators (e.g. biometric, long-term secret, password) [2] , [3] , [13] , [19] , as compared in Table 1 . They all have
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Noor Zaman . each unique setup phase before authentication. The goal of setup phase is to pre-distribute PUF's output on input of multifactor authenticators.
In 2009, Frikken et al. have firstly presented a robust authentication protocol (FBA) using PUF [13] . In FBA, only user equipped with a PUF-embedded device can be authenticated from a server. It uses zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (ZKPK) for an user authentication. Resende et al. have removed inefficient ZKPK structure and have proposed a new PUF-base multi-factor authentication (RMA) with mutual authentication [19] . Recently, Byun has efficiently improved the RMA in terms of the number of rounds and operations (B19C) [2] . B19C is more efficient than RMA, but its security has not been guaranteed under formal security model. Byun also presented a generic PUF-based multi-factor AKE (B19J) [3] . B19J first executes a secure password-based AKE (PAKE) and derives an intermediate session key. Second, with PUF's output and the derived session key, B19J makes a final session key in a general way. It has been the first attempt to generally build a PUF-based multi-factor AKE with provable security. Very recently, a new end-to-end different PUF-based authentication has been proposed by Byun [4] . It enables for two different users who each has own distinct PUF-embedded device to establish an authenticated key exchange [4] . VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ In this paper, we focus on an authenticated key exchange protocol in a device based authentication setting where an user has a PUF-based device and its multi-factor authenticators desire to mutually authenticate a server. First, we reanalyze the security of PUF-based multi-factor authenticated key exchange (PMAKE) protocols in aspect of a new compromise attack. In all authentication phases of PMAKE schemes, PUF's unique outputs must be used for AN user authentication. That is, PMAKE first uses multi-factor authenticators to make an input d for PUF and then PUF outputs its unique answer s (s = PUF(d)). The secret output s is securely stored in server's database which is later utilized for the user authentication. We assume that each user is equipped with each PUF-embedded device that takes multi-factor authenticators as input and outputs a secret s. One main security goal is that the only valid user who holds both multi-factor authenticators and PUF-embedded device can successfully pass authentication process. Generally, in a secure multi-factor authenticated key exchange (MAKE) schemes, any adversary A cannot impersonate a valid users unless A corrupts all multi-factor authenticators such as password, biometrics, long-term secret. In recent PMAKE protocols, on the other hand, one natural question is that ''Is there any possibility for A to be authenticated from a server with just one authenticator (not all multi-factor authenticators)?''. For instance, A can just steal the secret s from server's database. The secret s is not authenticators but a final secret for an user authentication. By just capturing s, A can impersonate a specific user without multi-factor authenticators. One may argue that s should be also regarded as multi-factor authenticators and revealment of s naturally means revealment of multi-factor authenticators. However, our concern is that s is a final PUF's secret made from multi-factor authenticators and they are not same authenticators, i.e., nobody can make multi-factor authenticators from s while its inverse is possible. As illustrated in Fig. 2 , A does not need to corrupt all authenticators on the user side, but A is simply able to steal just one secret s from a server. Under this new compromise attack, we reanalyze recent PMAKE protocols. We demonstrate that some PMAKE protocols allows any adversary to impersonate a specific user just by using a PUF's output secret s.
To handle this new issue, we build a secure PUF-based device authentication and key exchange (PDAKE) that only users who necessarily equip multi-factor authenticators, password (pwd), long-term secret (k s ), biometric secret (k b ) and a device D ipuf (·) can pass an user authentication by a server. In our paper, we suppose much stronger adversary that not only corrupt multi-factor authenticators on a user side but also steal user's device D ipuf . That is, four multi-factor authenticators (password (pwd), long-term secret (k s ), biometric secret (k b ) and a device D ipuf (·)) can be corrupted by A. In addition, we allow A to corrupt a server S. Generally, the server S keeps authentication data in DB. Its DB is securely managed by DB administrator (DBA). These DB and DBA in S are independent targets for corruptions in real practice. For instance, secrets owned by a DBA and tables in DB are independently managed by each own way. Thus, in this paper, we classify corruption of S into two types S1, S2. First, S1 is a corruption case that A steals all table information V from a DB in S. Second, S2 is a corruption case that A steals DBA's secret δ. Under these two server corruptions, there are trivial cases that easily breaks total security or authentication. Thus we need to newly define a fresh session in PDAKE. That is, our security model never allows A to access both S1 and S2 corruptions since those two corruptions easily permit for A to impersonate both user and server.
To build a secure PDAKE scheme, we observe that only FBA protocol [13] has been still strong under our new server compromise attack (S1 or S2), i.e., in FBA, a server keeps g s rather than s in DB, it is impossible for A with g s to impersonate a specific user since successful authentication needs s from g s . However, FBA has not focused on AKE, but just considered an user one-way authentication from a server. They assumed a device on a user side, but corruption of device has not been considered in a security model. In this paper, we take a general approach to fulfill a secure PDAKE with mutual authentication. First, we assume that a device (D ipuf ) on user has an internal memory and embedded PUF(IPUF). An user can use D ipuf with a server to mutually authenticate each other. To formalize the PUF's output compromise attack, we newly define corruption query with a new freshness notion. To meet a new definition, our protocol securely combines an EDL [14] digital signature scheme with an IPUF on user device.
As illustrated in Fig.1 , our protocol is well applicable to make a secure channel in a cloud computing system. Generally, to securely access a cloud storage system or e-mail system, users should have a secure channel with an authenticated session key. These agreed session key are generally used as a symmetric encryption/decryption key and a message authentication key for sensitive users own data. For instance, Google titan security USB is a well-known physical USB device key for securely accessing Google accounts. That is, to protect accounts, Google users should put its titan USB into platforms (e.g., android, windows, mac) with its password. It is also known as a two-factor authentication (2FA). Our protocol is well harmonized with FIDO 2FA paradigm since they both mainly include a device authentication with a password. Also, FIDO and our protocol commonly allow a standard asymmetric cryptography such as a digital signature for user authentication, which is considerable advantage for easy application.
In Section 2, we explain basic cryptographic primitives for the protocol. We explain the existing PDAKE protocols in Section 3. Based on the protocols, we define a new security model in Section 4. In Section 5 we present our enhanced protocol with provable security. In Section 6, we analyze how much our proposal is efficient than others. In Section 7, we conclude with future works.
II. COMPUTATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES
A. FUZZY EXTRACTORS Definition 1 [11] : An (M , m, l, t, )-fuzzy extractor consists of two procedures, Gen(·), Rep(·); (1) Gen(·) outputs a string R ∈ {0, 1} l r and a helper string P ∈ {0, 1} * , on input W , guaranteeing that for any distribution W with min-entropy m, if (R, P) ← Gen(W ) then SD((R, P), (U l , P)) ≤ , where the SD means statistical distance. 
B. AN INTEGRATED PUF (IPUF)
An IPUF includes a fuzzy extractor to handle PUF's noisy and always outputs a fixed secret on a same input. IPUF is firstly defined in FBA protocol [13] then has been used in some protocols [7] , [19] . In this definition, we also follow the definition of IPUF defined in [7] , [13] . Definition 2 (IPUF [7] , [13] ): For any PPT adversary A, IPUF's output is indistinguishable from a random value. We define ipuf-ind-advantage and it should be negligible, as follows. − Verification algorithm Ver(σ, p k ): It verifies whether the given signature σ is a valid or not by using p k . Definition 4 (Existential unforgeability under chosen message attack): Existential forgery means a new valid signature forgery of (m, σ ) produced by an adversary A ds . Under adaptively chosen message attack, A is allowed to adaptively ask the signer to sign any message of its choice (m 1 , . . . , m i ) and obtain the corresponding signature (σ 1 , . . . , σ i ). Finally A ds produces a new valid signature (m, σ ) where m is a message not asked to the signer. Its unforgeability is defined by an existentical unforgeability under chosen message attack (eu-cma).
− (Registration) A ipuf executes a registration phase and freely selects d i and obtains its answers s i for (s
Definition 5 (Eu-cma secure EDL [14] digital signature based on the discrete logarithm problem): For example, ElGamal [12] , Schnorr [20] schemes are representative discrete logarithm based signature schemes. Its security are (tightly or loosely) proven to be eu-cma secure under random oracle model [14] . They have same public and private key setting, but has different signing and verifying processes. Here, we introduce the EDL scheme presented by Goh and Jarecki in 2003 [14] . It has been proven to be eu-cma secure under CDH assumption.
− Key generation algorithm KeyGen(1 k ): We assume p, q are large and safe primes and let g be a generator a subgroup g 0 , . . . , g q−1 with order q in Z * p . On input 1 k , it produces a pair of public (verification) and private (signing) key, Let's suppose that q is a large prime order and g is a generator of a subgroup in Z * p . A cdh is an adversary of CDH running in polynomial time. The advantage cdh is defined by probability that A cdh succeeds in computing g xy mod q from (g x mod q, g y mod q). The CDH assumption is that the probability, cdh is negligible. Definition 7 (DDH: Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption): Let's suppose that q is a large prime order and g is a generator of a subgroup in Z * p . A ddh is an adversary of DDH running in polynomial time. The advantage ddh is defined by probability that A ddh succeeds in distinguishing (g xy mod q, g x mod q, g y mod q) and (γ , g x mod q, g y mod q) for a random γ ∈ Z q . The DDH assumption is that the probability, ddh is negligible.
E. CHOSEN CIPHERTEXT ATTACK SECURE SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION

Definition 8 (SE: Symmetric Encryption): SE consists of three algorithms as follows.
− Key generation SSEKeyGen(1 n ): On input 1 n , it produces a symmetric key k for |k| ≥ n.
− Encryption algorithm E k (m): On input k and a plaintext m, it outputs a ciphertext c.
− Decryption algorithm D k (c): On input k and a ciphertext c, it outputs a plaintext m. Definition 9 (CCA-SE: Chosen Ciphertext Attack secure SE): For defining chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) secure symmetric encryption scheme, we consider an experiment for an adversary A se . Under CCA security, A se can obtain encryptions c 1 (= E k (m 1 )), . . . , c l (= E k (m 1 )) of messages m 1 , . . . , m l of its choices. Also, A se can obtain decryptions m 1 , . . . , m l for ciphertexts c 1 , . . . c l of its choices. We denote these oracle accesses O E,D . First, a key k is generated from SSEKeyGen(1 n ). A se can use O E,D and obtain chosen encryptions and plaintexts. A produces two target messages m 0 , m 1 with same length. For a random bit
All protocols throughout the paper are explained with the following common notations.
• S, U, S, U : They respectively mean two participants, a server and a user, and its identities.
• PUF(·): It denotes a physically unclonable function embedded in a device.
• D ipuf (·): It denotes U's PUF-based device.
• pwd, k u , k b : They respectively stand for a password, a long-term secret, a biometric secret information as U's multi-facto authenticators.
• d: It is generated from pwd, k u , k b and is used as an input for PUF(·).
• auth S , auth U : They are authenticators used for proving server, user itself, respectively.
• δ: It denotes a secret key for S. • φ: It is calculated by f (δ, U ) and used as a symmetric key where f (·) is a psudorandom function.
• sk S , sk U : They respectively denote a common session key for S and U.
• U s , U p : They respectively denote U's secret key (signing key) and public key (verification key).
III. PUF-BASED MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS
We analyze recent PDAKE protocols [2] , [13] , [19] . All protocols perform own setup phase between S and U through a secure channel. In fact, this setup phase enables for U to securely deliver unique value of PUF(d) to S. Here, we assume that q is a strong prime order of a subgroup with its generator g in Z * p . H j are hash functions • Setup. In a setup phase, U executes Gen(PUF(·)) with an input d i (= H 1 (c i ||pwd)). Then, (s i , h i ) are computed from Gen(PUF(d i )). S secretly maintains these tuples (c i , h i , s i ) in own database. In particular, the value s i is used in an authentication phase as an authentication factor.
• Authentication. For mutual authentication, two parties, S and U, should check if they both really obtain s i each other. First, S already has s i from setup phase. Second, U can also compute s i from Rep(r i , h i ) where r i = PUF(d i ) since U has a valid PUF-based device and a password pwd. Afterwards, through s i (= K i ), U and S exchange g x , E K i (g x ), and finally compute and check auth U = auth S = H 2 (U ||S||X ||Y ||K ) for K = g xy in step (4) and (5) . The agreed session key sk S (= sk U ) is H 4 (U ||S||X ||Y ||K S ).
2) ANALYSIS
In RMA15 [19] , it has been claimed that the only user U who memorizes pwd and holds PUF-based device is able to produce r i (= K i ) and passes the authentication with auth U . However, if we assume any adversary who just steals verifier information (c i , h i , s i ) regarding U, then she always impersonates U without having pwd and PUF-based device at all, as follows.
• Upon receiving (c i , h i ), an adversary A makes own values X = g x for a random x . In step (2), she sends U , X to S then receives S,Ȳ .
• Setup. One main difference with RMA15 is that B19 protocol applies user's multi-factor authenticators (pwd, k u , k b ) to make an input d for PUF(·). That is, (s, h) is made from Gen(PUF(d)) for d = H 1 (pwd|| k u ||k b ). Then S maintains (U , s, h) in a database. In an authentication phase, S uses s to check if U really has PUF(·) function. In fact, S does not need to maintain a helper data h in a database.
• Authentication. As in Fig. 3 , S already has s for U through a setup phase. Since a valid U has PUF(·) function, U can compute s from Rep(PUF(d), h) for d(= H 1 (pwd||k u ||k b )). Afterwards, U and S exchange encrypted Diffie-Hellman values, E s (g x ), E s (g y ) for establishing t(= H 2 (g xy ||U ||S||g x ||g y )). The common value t is used for auth U , auth S for authenticating each other. A common session key sk(= H 5 (t||0)) is also established by using t.
A valid user U in B19C [2] is assumed to have four authenticators; a memorable password pwd, a long-term secret key k u , a biometric information k b , and a PUF-based device. If we VOLUME 7, 2019 suppose that an adversary A obtains s from a server, then she always impersonate U without having any pwd, k u , k b , PUF-based device at all, as follows.
• Since A knows s, A is able to make a validX (= g x ) in step (1) for a random x . Upon receivingȲ , A establishes a common value t (= H 2 ((g y ) x ||U ||S||g x ||g y )) for a random x .
• Setup. U uses pwd to make an input d(= H 2 (H 1 (c||pwd||α))) where α is public description of the group Z * p and c is a random value given from S. U makes (s, h) from Gen(PUF(d)). Then U only memorizes pwd and sends g s , α to S. A list (U , c, g s , α, h) is maintained in a database.
• Authentication. One main difference is that an integrated PUF (IPUF) based device D ipuf (·) is applied into an user side. In Fig. 5 , detail steps on how D ipuf (·) works are illustrated by a square box. On receiving (c, α, N , h) from S, U executes D with an input (pwd, c, α, h).
, w(= y − c s) for a random y. U just delivers (c , w) to S. In fact, through an output (c , w) from D ipuf (·), U itself proves that U holds a valid IPUF-based device D ipuf (·) and knows a password pwd without revealing information on s, pwd. S only verifies this fact through checking the given c is equal to H 3 (g||g s ||g w · (g s ) c ||c).
Let's assume an adversary A who steals (U , c, g s , α, h) from S. From (U , c, g s , α, h), S cannot obtain s under a discrete logarithm assumption. Thus, A is never able to generate a valid response (c , w) since making a list (c , w) mainly requires s which is derived from PUF(·). That is, although A steals (U , c, g s , α, h) from S, A cannot impersonate U without having both PUF(·), pwd. Unlikely B19C and RMA protocols, FBA protocol is secure against a server impersonation attack.
3) NOTE ON PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACKS However, in [19] , a minor defect have been found in FBA protocol. It is claimed that FBA protocol is vulnerable on a password guessing attack. This attack relies on an assumption that A can access g s i for corresponding pwd i through setup phase where 1 ≤ i ≤ |D pw |, |D pw | is a password dictionary size. Then, the attack is performed as follows.
• Through interacting a setup phase, A obtains g s i for all candidate passwords pwd i where 1 ≤ i ≤ |D pw |. The secret values s i are made from (s i , h i ) ← Gen(PUF(d i )) for d i ← H 2 (H 1 (c||pwd i )||α) as described in a setup phase, but the secrets s i are not revealed to A. That is, A finally obtains lists R = (c i , α i , g s i , h i ).
• For a randomly chosen N , A chooses (c i , α i , h i ) from R and sends (c i , α i , N , h i ) as the first message then A obtains (c , w) from U.
Then A also computes c = H 3 (g, g s ,t , N ) and checksc is equal to the valid c . If they are equal, then a pwd i is a valid pwd. Otherwise, another A tries another password pwd i in |D| Remark 10: However, it is worthy to note that the above attack is not valid. In fact, the list set R = (c i , α i , g s i , h i ) made by A regarding pwd i is totally distinct from (c, α, g s ). Precisely to say, (c, α, g s ) does not belong to R by A even though there exists a same password pwd. Note that Gen(·) algorithm is a probabilistic algorithm that takes an input PUF(d) and randomly outputs (s, h) for even a same d. Thus, when A does checks,c cannot be equivalent with c even if g s == g s i for a same password pwd. Therefore, A cannot determine pwd i is wrong guess or not. Furthermore, an assumption that A obtains verifier information R = (c i , α i , g s i , h i ) is so strong. No password-based AKE scheme is secure against a password guessing attack under stolen verifier scenario, yet.
Remark 11: Very recently, another weakness in FBA has been observed by Byun and Jeong [7] . It shows that FBA protocol is insecure against a password guessing attack under a PUF assumption. The PUF assumption allows A to directly access PUF(·) oracles. Thus, A makes d i (= H 2 (H 1 (c||pwd i )||α)) for a chosen pwd i and obtains an answer PUF(d i ). With public Rep(·) and h, A finally calculates s (=Rep (PUF(d i ), h) ). Then, if g s of pwd is given, A always mount a password guessing attack on pwd by checking that g s is equal to g s .
IV. SECURITY DEFINITION
Our security notions and definitions are based on a wellknown BPR model [9] that is designed for a secure PAKE by Bellare, Rogaway, and Pointcheval. Unlike BPR model, our model defines four kinds of Corrupt queries which models that four multi-factor authenticators may be lost by accidents or intentionally revealed by hacks. We assume that two entities, a user U and a server S and they execute the protocol multiple times. i-th (resp. j-th) instance executed by entity U (resp. S) is denoted as i U (resp. j S ). An adversary A asks queries and obtains its outputs as follows. • Execute( i U , j S ). It outputs protocol messages from honest execution between i U and j S .
• Test( i A ). This query is used to measure A's advantage on the agreed session key. When this query is asked, a coin is flipped to decide a bit b that has 1 or 0 value. If b = 1, a real session key is outputted to A. Otherwise, a random key is outputted to A. We use the same notion of session identifier, partner id, partnering as it is defined in [3] , [9] .
Definition 12 (Session Identifier, Partner id, and Partnering [3] , [9] ): We denote sid i U a session identifier for i U . It is a concatenation of protocol messages sent and received by i U . A partner ID is defined as a corresponding participant with whom i U is interacting, which is denoted as pid i U . Instances i U and j S are partnering if the following conditions are satisfied: (1) Both instances have accepted with a same session key, session ID, partner ID; (2) 4) . On the other hand, all C(U , 1), C(U , 2), C(U , 3), and C(U , 4) are true then it also becomes true regardless of C(S, 1) and C(S, 2). First, C(S,1) ∧ C(S,2) = true means that A obtains all DB contents and δ. That is, this means a total corruptions of S or U which easily leads to S or U impersonation attack. Second, C(U , 1) ∧ C(U , 2) ∧ C(U , 3) ∧ C(U , 4) = true means that A obtains all multi-factor authenticators including a device. This is also a clear case that A can impersonate U or S. Except those cases, we allow A to ask corrupt queries. For instance,
Definition 15 (Session Key Security [3] , [9] ): When A asks a Test query to a fresh session, an experiment toss a coin for determining a bit b. Regarding b, A outputs a guessing bit b . A's advantage is defined as Adv sk P (T , k) = 2 Pr[b = b ] − 1. A given protocol P is defined to be session key secure if Adv sk P (T , k) is bound to a negligible function ε(k) in k for polynomial time T ,
where k is a security parameter. VOLUME 7, 2019 
V. A NEW PUF-BASED DEVICE AUTHENTICATED KEY EXCHANGE
We present a new PDAKE (PUF-based device authenticated key exchange) protocol secure against a new server compromise attack. Our protocol is based on IPUF embedded in D ipuf (·). A user proves itself by using outputs from D ipuf (·) on multi-factor input (pwd, k s , k b ), as illustrated in Fig. 6 . (δ, U ) ). In a database, S securely maintains (U , c φ , h) for
• Authentication. An authentication phase consists of three rounds. − U first inputs pwd, k s , k b into a device D ipuf (·). On inputs, D ipuf (·) computes s through Rep(PUF(d), h) for d(= H 1 (pwd||k s ||k b )). D ipuf (·) makes U s , U p fromH (s) and computes K s (= f (s||U )). Then D ipuf (·) computes X = g x mod p for a random x ∈ Z * p and encryptionX (= E K s (X )) with K s . D ipuf (·) also generates a signature σ forX and produces an output σ,X . U receives σ,X from D ipuf (·) and sends U , σ,X to S. − On inputs U , σ,X , S first obtains U p , K s from decryption of c φ . S verifies σ with U p . If it is valid then S decryptsX and obtains X . For a random y ∈ Z * p , S also computes Y = g y mod p and X y mod p. Then S can establish t(= H 3 (U p ||g xy ||U ||S||g x ||g y )) which is used for making auth S (= H 4 (t||1) ). S sends Y , auth S to U.
− U computes Y x and makes a same secret t(= H 3 (U p ||g xy ||U ||S||g x ||g y )). Then U checks if the given auth S is equal to H 4 (t||1). If it is successful then U authenticates S. U sends auth U (= H 5 (t||2)) back for user authentication.
− S also checks if the given auth U is valid. If it is valid, S authenticates U. S and U makes a common session key sk(= H 6 (t||0)).
B. DISCUSSION ON THE PROTOCOL DESIGN
We mainly discuss on two key structure (U s , U p ), password security against stolen device, and platform security, which are fundamental components for practical security.
• Keys for Authentication and Encryption. For a secure AKE design, how authentication and encryption keys are made is important. D ipuf (·) internally makes three keys U s , U p , K s on inputs of multi-factor authenticators pwd, k s , k b . Precisely, intermediate keys U s , U p , K s are all generated from a seed s based on an IPUF on inputs of pwd, k s , k b . A secret key U s is used by U for signing a random messageX while U p is used by S for verifying by U's signature. U is able to make U s , U p , K s through only D ipuf (·) but S is able to obtain only U p , K s from decryption c φ with φ(= f (δ||U )). Also, S cannot compute U s from U p due to the hardness of a discrete logarithm problem. This design principle makes a protocol strong against an insider forgery scenario that any adversary S tries to compute U s from U p for making σ itself without multi-factor authenticators and D ipuf (·). In our protocol, even if server's total corruptions (c φ , δ) happen, it would be hard for any adversary to compute U s from (c φ , δ) due to the hardness of a discrete logarithm problem. Let's then discuss an encryption key. Our K s is used for encryption key. D ipuf (·) simply encrypts a keying material g x with U p . One may argue that encryption of keying is redundancy and may design that U sends (U , σ, g x ) in step (2). If we assume g x is not encrypted on U's side, then anyone can impersonate S. On receiving (U , σ, g x ), anyone generates (g y , auth s ) for auth s = H 4 (t||1), t = H 3 (g xy ||U ||S||g x ||g y ). That is, by encrypting g x with K s , only a server S holding a valid δ can derive an encryption key K s from c φ (= E φ (U p ||K s )) by using a secret φ = f (δ||U ). It also enables for S to finally make a valid authenticator auth S .
• Password security by using PUF-based device. Let's analyze an impersonation attack when D ipuf (·) is lost. We suppose an insider adversary A i.e., S which only holds δ and tries to impersonate U. In order to generate valid (σ,X ), A should obtain pwd, k s , k b . That is, without them, D ipuf (·) is useless for an user impersonation attack. Let's assume another scenario that A already obtains k s , k b . Then, through D ipuf (·), A can ask a query on pwd , k s , k b for a candidate password pwd and obtain its output (σ , X ). Under this scenario, our main concern is whether A can do an off-line password guessing attack on pwd or not. From (σ , X ), not only it is impossible for A to verify σ 's validity but also A cannot decrypt X . The reason is that these cases require either U p or K p , but A cannot access them at all. On the other hand, if we suppose that (U , c φ , h) is revealed by DB corruption (Corrupt( j S , 2)). This case does not give any information on U p , K s either since they are encrypted with φ. Lastly, if we suppose the worst case that A corrupts both (U , c φ , h) and δ then A can easily recover U p , K s from c φ . And, A checks if σ is valid or not with U p , which eliminates candidate passwords from a password dictionary. As we discussed earlier, any adversary who queries Corrupt( j S , 1), Corrupt( j S , 2), and Corrupt( i U , 4) can always do mount an off-line dictionary attack or impersonate U , which has already been excluded in the freshness definition.
• Platform security. Our protocol assumes an IPUF that is embedded in a device D ipuf (·). This device can be implemented in an independent and detachable USB type to any mobile or PC platform. On the other hand, it may be implemented inside a platform. In this paper, we haven't consider platform or D ipuf (·)'s inside attack such that mobile platform can be hacked or independent D ipuf (·) can be corrupted. For instance, if s made from IPUF in D ipuf (·) on input of valid (pwd, k s , k b ) may be directly hooked by hacks or ephemeral random values in D ipuf (·) may be revealed, then the AKE security is not guaranteed in our protocol. Design of PDAKE under much strengthen security model including platform security remains future work.
C. SECURITY PROOF
Theorem 16: A is a polynomial time adversary against PDAKE protocol P within a polynomial time bound T . A can ask q s send queries, q e execute, q h 2 , q h 3 , q h 4 , q h 5 , q h 6 hash queries, q d device queries. Then,
Proof: We define several games from the real game G 0 to G 6 . In each game, when A asks a Test query, a coin for bit d is flipped to specify the answer on a real key or a random key. Then A guesses a bit d and outputs d . Let S i be an event that d = d in G i and Pr[S i ] is its probability.
Game G 0 : This is a real protocol and A's advantage on a session key is defined by • Send queries: G 1 can simulate all Send queries according to the protocol's steps.
− Send( i U , start): Through input authenticators (pwd, k s , k b ), IPUF makes s = Rep(r, h) where r = PUF(d), d = H 1 (pwd||k s ||k b ). G 1 computes U s =H (s), U p = g U s and K s = f (s||U ). For a random value x ← Z * p , G 1 makes X = g x and X (= E K s (X )). Then G 1 generates a signature σ on X with U s . A message list (U , σ,X ) is returned as an answer.
− Send( j S , U ||σ ||X ): G 1 first verifies σ with U p . If it is successful then G 1 makes Y = g y for y ← Z * p . Then G 1 computes auth U = H 4 (t||1) for t = H 3 (g xy ||U ||S||g x ||g y ) and finally outputs (Y , auth S ) as an answer.
. G 1 checks if auth S is equal to the given auth S . If they are equal then G 1 makes sk = H 6 (t||0) with acceptance and outputs auth U = H 5 (t||2). Otherwise, G 1 outputs a failure.
− Send( j S , auth U ): G 1 makes auth U = H 5 (t||2) and checks if auth U is equal to the given auth U . If they are equal then G 1 makes sk = H 6 (t||0) with acceptance. Otherwise, G 1 outputs a failure. • Test query: For a coin tossing d, a real session key sk is outputted if d = 1. Otherwise if d = 0, a random key is outputted. From simulating random oracles H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 , H 5 , H 6 , collision cases naturally happen. Here we exclude those cases, which is within each birthday paradox bound
where q h 2 , q h 3 , q h 4 , q h 5 , q h 6 is the number of querying hash H 2 , H 3 , H 4 , H 5 , H 6 . Game G 2 : In this game, we consider an adversary who tries to break symmetric encryptions ofX . All simulations are same except a case of Send( i U , start) query. On Send( i U , start) query, G 2 selects another random x and computes X (= E K s (X )) for X = g x . Other processes are same, i.e., G 1 generates a signature σ on X with U s and (U , σ,X ) is returned as an answer. In G 1 ,X (= E K s (X )) is returned to A.
On the other hand, in G 2 ,X (= E K s (X )) is returned to A. Then, if we assume that A distinguishes two games, then it is straightforward to build an algorithm B to break a CCA-SE by definition.
Game G 3 : In this game, we define an event FM1 that A produces valid σ for X . Unless FM1 happens, two games G 2 , G 3 are same. This event can be analyzed in two ways;
Corrupt happens (C) and Corrupt does not happen (NC).
− Pr[FM1 ∧ C]: Through Corrupt( j S , 1) query, A obtains δ and computes φ = f (δ||U ) where f is a pseudo random function. However, unless A has c φ from Corrupt( j S , 2), A neither decryptX nor compute a valid g xy that leads a valid session key. As defined in the definition, if Corrupt( j S , 1) and Corrupt( j S , 2) queries happen, the session is not regarded as a fresh session. Even if A produces a valid X , Y with negligible probability, the protocol has a verification step for σ on a server side. That is, regardless of Corrupt queries, A should break the security of an eu-cma secure EDL digital signature scheme [14] , which is based on a CDH assumption. If we assume such an adversary, it is easy to construct a CDH solver. This is shown in the following lemma. Lemma 16: If we assume an adversary A that produces valid σ, X , then we can construct an algorithm B breaks EDL.Sig's eu-cma security.
Proof: When B adaptively asks a signature on m l , the current game G 3 simulates each answer for Send( i U , start) and Send( i U , Y ||auth S ) queries, as follows. Then B finally obtains its signature σ l through its answers.
. G 2 computes U s =H (s) and U p = g U s . For m l , G 3 generates a signature σ l on m l with U s . Then, X is made from computation of D K s ( m l ). A message list (U , σ l , m l ) is returned as an answer.
− Send( i U , Y ||auth S ): G 3 uses X l (= D K s ( m l )) to computes auth S = H 4 (t||1) for t = H 3 ( X l y ||U ||S|| X l ||Y ). G 3 checks if auth S is equal to the given auth S . If they are equal then G 3 makes sk = H 6 (t||0) with acceptance and outputs auth U = H 5 (t||2). Otherwise, G 3 outputs a failure. In this way, B can obtain a valid signature σ l for m l of its choice. We define a pair of queried message and signature to be S σ = {( m 1 , σ 1 ), . . . , ( m l , σ l )}. At some point, A produces valid σ, X then B simply exploits σ, X . The probability that (σ, X ) ∈ S σ is q s 2|Z p | , which is negligible. The pair (X , σ ) is returned as a new forgery of EDL signature. Other Corrupt queries may happen on a user side, i.e., A may query Corrupt( i U , 1), Corrupt( i U , 3), Corrupt( i U , 4) and finally obtain k u , k b , D ipuf (·). Then A's goal is to know a password pwd through password dictionary attacks and finally derive a secret seed s for forgery. First, A chooses a candidate password pwd in a password dictionary |D| and asks D ipuf (·) query with inputs k u , k b , pwd and obtains σ , X . Then A do ask a Send( j S , U ||σ ||X ) query. If its output is reject (or failure) then the chosen pwd can be eliminated from |D|. This step can be performed until Send( j S , U ||σ ||X ) does not return failure. This is exactly how an on-line password guessing attack is performed in our protocol. However, if a verification key U p is revealed to A, then it is even possible for A to mount an offline password guessing attack. That is, A would verify σ , X by itself through a public key U p . However, in our protocol, A only gets U p through Corrupt( 
Finally, in this game, we have the following.
Game G 5 : In this game, we consider an event FM3 that A produces the valid third message auth U in the protocol. Unless FM3 happens, two games G 4 , G 5 are same. To make auth U , there are also two cases; the first case is for calculating t and the second case is to just guess an output H 5 (t||1) without t.
By the same analysis of G 5 , we have the following result.
Game G 6 : In this game, PUF's recovery output (Rep(r, h) ) is simulated by a random value R. That is, G 6 simulates each answer for Send( i U , start) query, as follows. − Send( i U , start): G 6 simulates Rep(r, h)'s output as a random value R and then G 6 computes U s =H (R) and U p = g U s . For a random value X = g x , x ← Z * q , G 6 makes an encryptionX = E K s (X ) with K s (= f (R||U )). Then G 6 generates a signature σ on X with U s . A message list (U , σ,X ) is returned as an answer. Lemma 17: If there exists A that distinguishes G 6 and G 5 , then there exists a polynomial time algorithm B that breaks IPUF assumption by using A.
Proof: By definition of IPUF, B prepares d i (= H 1 (pwd i ||k s i ||k b i )) as many as B wants and obtains its corresponding outputs (s i , h i ) ∈ L p in a registration phase. B can ask and obtain pwd, k u , k b by Corrupt( i U , a) queries for a = 1, 2, 3. This enables B to make d(= H 1 (pwd||k s ||k b )) and obtain (s, h) = Gen (PUF(d) ). Thus, we note that L p includes (s, h) for d(= H 1 (pwd||k s ||k b )). In querying phases, B freely asks d i and obtains Rep (PUF(d), h) . In a challenge phase, B selects d j . And, a random bit d is chosen. If d = 0, s(= Rep (PUF(d) , h)) is given to B. Otherwise if d = 1, a random value R is given to B. It does mean that G 5 responds s as an answer of Rep(PUF(d), h), but in game G 6 , it is answered by a uniformly random value R. If A returns a bit b then B outputs b as an output d. The probability that d j has not been queried in querying phase, which is defined by λ(= 1 − 
Game G 7 : In this game we use a random DDH tuple (X = g x , Y = g y , z ∈ Z p ) to simulate Send queries. In answering all Send queries, X , Y are replaced by X = g x , Y = g y . In case of g xy , it is replaced by z. An agreed session key sk is simulated by H 6 (t||0) where t = H 3 (z||U ||S||X ||Y ). We note that H 6 , H 3 are random oracles. Lemma 18: If there exists A that distinguishes G 6 and G 7 , then one can build a polynomial time algorithm B that breaks DDH assumption by using A.
Proof: For guessing a real tuple (d = 0) or a random tuple (d = 1) , B just outputs b as an output d when A outputs b . It is easy to derive ddh between two games, as follows. ddh 
Through games G 3 to G 7 , we have already excluded the event Auth S 2 that A makes t(= H 3 (g xy ||U ||S||g x ||g y )). Then, since H 3 , H 6 is a random oracle, A's guessing probability on sk = H 6 (t||0) in this game is 1 2 unless Auth S 2 happens.
Pr[S 7 ] = 1 2
We obtain the following result through the equations (1)∼(12) for λ = 1 − q p |L p | , l h = l h 1 + l h 2 + l h 3 + l h 4 + l h 5 + l h 6 . 
VI. COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS
Our PDAKE needs three communication flows that is the least flows for constructing a secure mutual authentication. Although FBA needs two flows, only uniliteral authentication has been considered in the protocol. Regarding communication size, only B19C is better than ours, but it has not considered either provable security or a new server compromise attack. In aspect of computation, since our PDAKE has applied a digital signature, comparison table shows that ours are not better than others for both user and server. However, its additional cost (or use of a digital signature) is unavoidable for thwarting the new server compromise attack. Note that other schemes have not considered the server compromise attack.
Privacy here means to protect users identifier from outsider adversaries. It is usually achieved encryption of identifier between participants. Privacy is not considered in our scheme. However, B19J scheme guarantees the privacy. More precisely to say, B19J is a generic construction to securely convert a secure PAKE to a PUF-based multi-factor AKE. It means that B19J's privacy is dependent of PAKE's privacy. Moreover, since it has been constructed in a generic way, it naturally requires much more communication flows than others. Instead, our PDAKE not only needs three flows but also thwart a new server compromise attack.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we raised an security issue on PUF's output compromise attack in which an adversary can impersonate any user by only using PUF's output regardless of having other multi-factor authenticators. Under the new attack, we analyze recent PUF-based multi-factor authenticated key exchange protocols. By the user's memorable password, it is never simple work to counter the attack. We first design a PUF-based device on an user side that takes inputs of multi-factor authenticators including password and outputs a PUF's secret s inside device and then finally produces a valid signature on a random message X (= g x ). We find that this signature based approach prevents adversaries from user impersonation, possible known attacks like password guessing attack. By securely combine the PUF-based device with a Diffie-Hellman based AKE, we finally constructed a provably secure PUF-based device AKE.
